More Anecdotes

First of all, the accident on Nov 17, 1967 had 5 deaths and 2 survivors. Those killed were 1st Lt. Theodore W. Johnson (DOB 07/10/42, Westfield, NY), Maj William E. McDonald (DOB 02/03/30, Memphis, TN) , Maj Karl D. Hezel (DOB 12/08/33, Cranford, NJ) , Capt Rey L. Duffin (04/23/31, Tooele, UT) , Maj Max E. Nichols (DOB 06/06/29, Houghton, NY. In this accident the plane bellied in and hit a drainage ditch just short of the runway and ruptured a fuel cell or tank and started to burn. Two EWOs were observed escaping from the EW hatch. The pilot ejected on the ground when smoke and fire consumed the cockpit and the fireman leaning against the cockpit on a ladder was unable to open the damaged hatch. He ejected and came back down on the burning aircraft area.

I am a very fortunate survivor of the crash of a EB-66 on Dec 6, 1967 at Takhli AB. I also was on the spare crew waiting to take off to replace a damaged EB-66 that came in to land with only one engine on Nov 17, 1967 and crashed right in front of us.

I am quite certain the bullet situation described occurred in the Dec 6, 1967 accident because I was told of it by the Flight Surgeon while I was in the hospital. I told him I had heard gunfire while I was on the ground waiting for the helicopter to pick me up in the jungle. He said it came from a crew members' survival vest after a flare exploded on impact and caused the spare bullets to fire.

In our accident 3 survived and 3 were killed. Ron McBride , Al Taylor and I were fortunate to survive. Al and I had relatively minor injuries and returned to fly at Tahkli. I believe Ron broke or injured his back. Those killed were Cpt Larry A. Moore
( 03/08/40 , Marion, IA ) , 1st Lt. Paul S. Krzynowek, (11/01/43 , Housatonic, Maine) and LtCol Jack M. Youngs (10/24/21 , Independence, Missouri). Everyone ejected from the plane. LtCol Youngs was the pilot and ejected upwards and Larry and Paul were EWO's and ejected downward. Ron was the Nav and ejected upwards and Al and I were EWO's and ejected downward.

There was considerable discussion in the "hootches" and O' Club between Nov 17 and Dec 6 about the possibility of releasing your parachute strapes under 400 feet and it is felt after the last accident that it was a factor in the delay in getting out of the aircraft since some straps were found disconnected after the crash. I did not release my straps but had trouble finding the D-ring between my legs. It did not come up and I had to rotate the handles on each side of the seat twice to get the ring to come up. I was the third one to eject. Ron and Al went first.

I would like to make contact with Ron or Al if anyone knows how to contact them. I have talked to Larry's widow, Diane, in the January 2003. The information I gave on the crewmembers above was obtained from the travelling Viet Nam Wall of Honor data base when I stopped to see it. I hope this clears up some of the information about the two accidents.

Tthe first accident, as I recall, one of the EWOs was just climbing through the upper escape hatch when the heat of the fire reportedly ignited the 50 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition in his survival vest and killed him. Lt Larry A. Moore (EWO) or Lt Col Jack M. Young (Pilot), who both lost their lives at Takhli on approach to landing in a 'C' model. The nav, Ron McBride, and at least two of the EWOs were able to eject safely. I think the fourth EWO was killed. Arvid Peterson, who was on that aircraft, might supply names/details.

In the second accident [November or December 1967], everyone was killed except 2 EWOs who ejected and lived [Major Al Taylor and Capt Robert (?) Peffley].

They came close to being victims of a procedure that the SAC-Dominated EB-66 Operation had implemented regarding the 400 foot absolute altitude for downward ejection from the C-Model.

Some SAC Weenies unofficially changed the C-Model check-list procedure to have the EWOs unbuckle their parachute leg straps when the aircraft went below 400 feet AGL on the landing approach – under the rationale that in the event of a crash, time would be saved in getting out of your parachute and egressing from the aircraft.

Al Taylor and Peffley said that when the aircraft rolled out of control on final approach they were able to get one leg strap re-fastened before they ejected horizontally and survived.

That ended the SAC procedure of unfastening parachute leg straps below 400 feet AGL.

Another SAC procedure that nearly caused an EB-66E ejection on takeoff roll was using the term “Reject” instead of “Abort”.

The aircraft was rolling down the runway when the former SAC pilot decided to terminate the takeoff, and came on the interphone with “Reject. Reject. Reject” instead of “Abort”. The Navigator and EWO were reaching for their ejection handles when they realized the pilot had said “Reject” and not “Eject”.

Standardization is indeed an excellent invention – once a common-sense system of terminology and understanding is established and not deviated from.

Since Al Taylor had 1 more take-off than landing recorded in his Form 5, I jokingly suggested that he volunteer to demonstrate the Fulton Recovery System at Takhli in 1968.

For those who aren’t familiar, the Fulton Recovery System was developed as a means of extracting downed airmen, agents, special forces etc from within enemy territory.

A fighter aircraft drops 2 canisters to a downed airman – one containing a tank of hydrogen and the second canister a balloon, nylon webbing and an Extraction Suit.

The downed airman dons the Extraction Suit that is attached to the nylon webbing with the balloon at the end of the webbing. The balloon is inflated with hydrogen and rises several hundred feet into the air with International Orange marking of the point on the nylon webbing for the C-130 pilot to aim at with a wish-bone snare that guides the nylon webbing into a locking mechanism to secure the line as it streams underneath the belly of the aircraft where the C-130 Loadmaster goes out on the tail gate ramp, attaches a winch to the nylon webbing and reels the rescued party into the C-130.

For some reason, Al Taylor declined the offer to show us how the Fulton Recovery System works.

Instead, a brave airman from our Personal Equipment Section volunteered – and received an Air Medal for his bravery [or foolhardiness].

LtCol. Noble J. McSwane, pilot, Commander, 6460th; was in the 11th TRS in Japan, WB-66D Stan Eval, then Sq. Ops. Officer. One of those too big for most cockpits. A hell of a good pilot. Started his career as a Glider Pilot but was too late to be at Normandy, was a Lt. B-29 AC in the early A-bomb days at Walker AFB; once successfully returned a B-29 for landing in zero-zero ice fog with a 20 man survival raft draped over the elevator (that took brute force, which he had). Just before I arrived at Takhli he pulled a pilot from a burning F-105, it was told, with one hand. He received the Airman's Medal for the act.

Capt. Ralph Saurs, pilot, 6460; was in the 11th TRW in Japan Capt. Ray Bilott, EW, 6460; Was in the 11th TRS in Japan Capt. William F. Kniffin, pilot, 6460; I believe he was an IP at Shaw Capt. David E. Bowersock was a pilot, he may have been In my class at Shaw. Capt. Phil Plutt was also a pilot in my class at Shaw. A gentleman with a smile.

The rest of the EB-66C crew shot down by a SAM, Feb. 4, 1967 Lt. John Fer, Pilot; POW returned Apr. 3, 1973 Maj. Woodrow Hoover Wilburn, Navigator; KIA, remains returned Dec. 20, 1969 Maj. Jack Bomar, EWO; POW, returned Mar. 4, 1973 Capt Herb Doby, EWO; KIA, remains returned Sep. 3, 1977 Capt. Russell Arden Poor, EWO; MIA, presumed dead Lt. John Owen Davies, EWO, POW, returned Feb. 18, 1973.

RB-66C Crash at Chelveston, UK
by Gerry Parker

An RB-66C (54-460) that crashed at Chelveston, Spring 62 (02/07/1962). The entire crew was: pilot - Skip Jones (who was also maintenance officer), nav - Richard "Moose" Morris, gunner -

Smith ejected but hit the ground in his seat because he grabbed the seat handles with his palms facing out and apparently could not get loose from the seat. Moose, something of an athlete, got out OK. Nez's hatch came off but his seat did not fire either. The Raven 4 (Becraft) thought that everyone in the back had ejected and called Skip that all were out except him, then ejected. Skip's seat did not fire, either - I forget why.

Since Skip was still aboard and the engines were still running at idle, he was able to reach the controls with some effort (remember that the seat and controls both stow when the left handle is operated) and get the plane on the ground in the field off the end of the Chelveston runway. The plane was seriously damaged when one of the wings clipped an old concrete bunker in the field but the fuselage held together.

Skip and Nez both climbed out the top, both quite surprised to see each other, and ran as the rear fuel tank was ruptured and caught fire. The fireman got that out before too long but the whole tank area was melted down to the bottom stringers when I saw the airplane. I was part of a crew that covered up the classified equipment before we let the press in to see the wreckage. There were pieces all along about a 300-400 yard path where it slid on the field. I played tennis with McCabe and knew him pretty well. Also, Smith had been on a crew with me at one time. It was the first time one of my friends was killed while flying so I remember it pretty clearly, even today.

Additional Information from Gerry Parker

The EWO's were Norbert "Nez" Maier (who survived), Reynolds McCabe (with whom I played tennis - he was a top-notch player, I was not), James Weymark and, as you noted, Bill Beecraft, Raven 4. The gunner was "Big" Smith, a large man about 6'4". (Smith was a member of our (John Risploi's) crew when we flew with Glen York/George Canterbury.) It was found that Smith rode his seat to ground. He inserted his hands into the handholds backwards in order to keep his elbows from hitting the sides on the hatch on the way out. The investigators speculated that he could not let go of the seat and, as you recall, the chute was deployed by the seat falling away and pulling the rip cord via the "zero" lanyard. Moose Morris, the navigator and something of an athlete and a smaller man, tried to beat the seat to the rip cord, landed on the field and walked into base ops. The 3 EWO's who successfully ejected hit the ground still in their seats. The aircraft subsequently landed, with Skip keeping the wings level, in the a farmers field beyond the end of the runway. A fire broke out and the rear fuselage fuel tank was consumed by the fire. The fire trucks got there in time to save the rest of the aircraft, although it was totaled. I was part a team that went to the site immediately after the crash and covered up every classified item before the press was allowed into the accident scene. There were pieces of airplane along a path several hundred yards long. There was also an old concrete bunker in the field left over from WWII. I do not recall if the aircraft hit the bunker or not, but I don't think it did since the aircraft slid to a stop along a straight line and was still pretty well lined up with the landing path. The only saving grace is that the engines did not quit altogether so Skip still had hydraulic power to the controls, once he was able to reach them. Neither he nor Nez knew that there was anyone else in the aircraft until both of them climbed out on top after the aircraft came to a stop.

A later briefing on the fuel filter by our local Douglas tech rep, Mr. Green, was very interesting. Early B-66's were fitted with a non-bypass fuel filter. A flight of 4 B-66's from Gander (I think) to Shaw started experiencing flame-outs after reaching altitude. Of a total of 8 engines, 7 flamed out at one time or another, although all landed safely at various places. As a result, a bypass fuel filter with a spring loaded screen was designed and the entire inventory of non-bypass screens was ordered destroyed. This was not done. The Chelveston accident aircraft has recently been to Tulsa for IRAN and had two of the old non-bypass filters. Outside temperature conditions were just right for fuel icing.

Regarding low approaches, my recollection is that the altitude restriction did not come out until after that accident. The minimum ejection altitude was 400 feet for the back end at that time. After the accident, Joe Wagner made a number of passes using the same profile to establish the altitude at which Skip's crew ejected. I believe that it was determined to be either 550 or 600 feet, supposedly high enough. Also, I believe a few months later a C model from Shaw ran low on fuel over the Atlantic due to a refueling malfunction and the pilot elected to bail out the crew from about 5,000 feet. The EWO's reported significant difficulty in getting rid of their seats, even from a high altitude, so this gave the "butt kicker" an even greater urgency. After our accident, an immediate altitude restriction on downward ejections was implemented, later to become 2,000 feet when the "butt kicker" was installed.

I left the B-66 in September of 1963 and never got in one again. I would be interested in hearing how the ejection seats performed in Vietnam.

Regarding Ron Hand, he is an Aggie so I looked him up in the latest Aggie directory of former students. Unfortunately, he is listed as "address unknown." I did find one former student with an e-mail address who is about the right age to be his son and wrote him a note. We'll see if anything comes back.

A write up of Bob Belcher's last flight can be viewed at: http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/b/b370.htm

Skip Jones made BGen or more in the Natl Guard over (I think) in Memphis.The three EWO's who didn't make it were just 20 or so feet too low. Their chutes were just starting to deploy when they hit on or beside the runway. That took care of the 400' rule for most of us... the higher the better.

Postscript by Jim Barbee

The Rushden Heritage Centre has numerous items are on display regarding Chelveston and other bases in Northamptonshire. One item of interest was a clipping from the Wednesday, February 7, 1962 Evening Telegraph Newpaper about the RB-66 Crash at RAFChelveston. This report was coordinated with and by Capt Robert Bussjaeger Wing Information Officer. The report states the names of the Officers killed as lst Lt James T. Weymark (26), Radar Operator, lst Lt William R. Becraft, (27), Radar Operator, lst Lt Renolds W. McCabe, Radar Operator, and SSgt Le Roy Daughenbaugh, Jr, (28) Flight Engineer. Injured Capt Charles E. Jones, III (30) Pilot, lst Lt Richard A. Morris (26) and lst Lt Norbert J. Maier (25) Radar Operator. The article states the crash happened at eigth minutes to two. There is more in the story, eye witnesses, etc. There are more newspaper articles about the incident but dates of print not listed.

In action in Vietnam from 1964 to 1970 was the single-seat F-105D, modified so as to carry bombs of the traditional type both in the hold and in under-wing pylons, and also the two-seat F-105G, Wild Weasel, widely used for locating the radar emissions of SAM batteries, which they would either neutralize with their own electronic equipment, making enemy tracking impossible, or by means of direct bombing.

All USAF squadrons furnished with the F-105 served in rotation in Southeast Asia, carrying out more than 20,000 offensive missions, and losing 330 planes, over a third of the total Thunderchief production. Employed without respite in strikes, mainly against North Vietnamese territory, the Thunderchiefs paid a heavy toll at the hands of anti-aircraft batteries, SAM missiles and enemy fighters, for they were easy prey unescorted and with a full bomb-load. It was rare for an F-105 pilot to complete his rota of 100 missions without being shot down at least once.

On October 5, 1965, for example, in the attack on the Lang Met bridge, out of 24 F-105Ds of the 562nd Squadron of the 23rd TFW, only eight found their way back to their departure base in Thailand. Yet with their bombs they destroyed the objective. Free of their bombs, on the other hand, the F-105s were no sitting ducks for enemy fighters; from 1966 to 1967 they shot down 26 MiG-17s and one MiG-21 in air duels, a tally second only to that of the Phantom F-4s. The first F-105Ds arrived at Korat, in Thailand, in August 1964 with the 36th Squadron of the 7441st TFW, followed by those of the 18th, 355th and 388th TFW.

We were the first to fly this mission out of Adana. Can't remember the other EWO's. We were heading west to a turn around point over the Black Sea
when this new gunlayer came up and tracked us, but only a few seconds
and it went down, but got a couple of good cuts. Returning westward,
nothing occurred until about abreast Sevastipol. Some other radar came up which I was working. All of a sudden Maj Hansen called over the intercom
"Fighters" or something to that effect. I replied I have a good radar I'm working, can you hang on course ? No reply, just a rapid left turn to 180 and descending. Later he briefed us of two fighters very high above on an intercept course coming from the North. Very exciting for a few minutes. We did get the location of the gunlayer. One of the follow-on missions, I believe it was Bill Tunis, had a Mig come up from behind flying formation!! tucked in on the starboard side about 20' away. Tunis had his 35mm camera, but was so excited the pictures came out all blurred. The gunner, (for the life of me I can't remember his name Ssgt ?, head Mormon on the Base. Anyway, he grounded himself, because he didn't see the Mig on his radar!!

Postscript by Ned Colburn

Although we didn't get intercepted, this brought back memories of my 30th birthday [17 September 1961] and 3 other flights on ELINT missions over the Black Sea in RB-66C 389.

We were at Incirlik AB, Adana, Turkey on Operation Scap Iron/Checkmate from Shaw to monitor a planned Russian satellite launch.

As I recall, we had 3 RB-66C models deployed -- pilots were Major Paul Bjork, Captain Alvin Bobbitt and Capt Jim Byram.

The EB-47s from Forbes AFB, Kansas were there -- as well as the Navy A3Ds and Willie Victor [EC-121] from Rota, Spain.

The SAC types didn't wear any name tags or wings on their flight suits and couldn't talk about why they were at Incirlik.

We had gone through flight training with many of the SAC crewmembers and had fun asking them who they really were and what they were doing in Turkey.

By contrast, we took the Navy types through the RB-66C -- and they gave us a tour of the A3D and Willie Victor.

Lead-in by Bob Stamm

My navigator, Bob Frank, and I used to shake our heads in wonder at some of the discussions Carl Covey and Paul Bjork used to get into. We often wondered what their intercom sounded like on the long delivery flights we shared. Cheers Stamm

To: Robert Stamm

Dear Bob,

Despite the current Air Force Policy of Don't Ask - Don't Tell - you Asked and I'm gonna Tell what it was like to fly with Major Paul Bjork and Captain Carl Covey as the navigator!

Operation Scrap Iron/Checkmate provides one of the best examples.

10 September 1961:

Briefing at Shaw AFB, Sumter, SC. 3 RB-66C being deployed to Incirlik AB, Adana, Turkey to fly ELINT missions over the Black Sea during suspected launch of Russian satellites.

Pilots: The 3 B's [Bjork, Bobbitt, Byram].

Route:

First Leg: Non-Stop from Shaw AFB, SC to RAF Chelveston, England with Air-to-Air Refuelings over Bermuda and the Azore Islands.

Second Leg: RAF Chelveston to Sigonella NAS, Sicily.

Third Leg: Sigonella NAS to Incirlik AB, Turkey.

As Mission Commander, Major Paul Bjork presided over the Crew Briefing and began by saying that we would fly in loose 3 ship formation [within radio range?] with Captain Alvin Bobbitt #2 and Captain Jimmy Byram #3.

Special Assignments included 1st Lt David Loeb being appointed as Major Bjork's Batman, whose many duties included carrying Bjork's B-4 bag and emptying Bjork's relief bottle at every stop.

The non-stop flight to RAF Chelveston was uneventful - apart from the one-way give and take [Offensive and Defensive] dialogue between Major Bjork as the Aircraft Helmsman and Captain Carl Covey as Bjork's Magellan, with Carl spring-loaded to the Defensive Position just trying to survive.

Upon landing at RAF Chelveston, Paul Bjork ordered everyone not to depart the base or head for London - while he himself disappeared toward RAF Alconbury.

11 September 1961: Departed RAF Chelveston for Sigonella NAS, Sicily for refueling and onward travel to Turkey.

As we neared Sigonella while watching smoke bellow from the volcano crater in Mt. Etna, Carl Covey announced on the interphone that he had Sigonella on his radar scope off to the right of our aircraft.

Paul Bjork responded with "I've got the field in sight" -- then cancelled our IFR clearance with Catania Control and called Sigonella Tower with: "Air Force 389, flight of 3 RB-66s, request VFR approach and landing, 360 degree overhead pattern".

Sigonella Tower responded with, "Air Force 389, understand a flight of 3 RB-66s, report 5 mile initial, left break".

At this point, Carl Covey questioned whether or not Bjork had the correct airfield in sight - and was summarily dismissed, chastised and told to shut-up, with further instructions for everyone to stay off ship's interphone so Bjork could fly the aircraft.

Paul Bjork then called Bobbitt and Byram, with "OK Guys, tuck it in real tight - we're going to show these U.S. Navy and Italian types how to fly close formation and put on a real air show".

Bobbitt and Byram got as close as possible to the other's aircraft paint - and the show began!

Bjork: Sigonella Tower. Air Force 389, flight of 3 -- 5 miles initial.

Sigonella: Roger 389, not in sight, continue approach, report 1 mile initial.

Bjork: Sigonella, 389, 1 mile initial.

Sigonella: Roger 389. Not in sight, continue approach, report left break.

Bjork: Sigonella, 389, left beak for landing.

Sigonella: Roger 389. Not in sight. Discontinue approach and re-enter pattern, report 5 mile initial.

A go-around was made, and we again entered initial for a 360 overhead pattern and landing.

Bjork: Sigonella Tower. Air Force 389, flight of 3 -- 5 miles initial.

Sigonella: Roger 389, not in sight, continue approach, report 1 mile initial.

Bjork: Sigonella, 389, 1 mile initial.

Sigonella: Roger 389. Not in sight, continue approach, report left break.

Bjork: Sigonella, 389, left beak for landing.

Sigonella: Roger 389. Not in sight. Are you sure you're at the right airfield?

Bjork: Roger! Absolutely! We're directly over Sigonella Airfield.

A third approach was started, and after turning on initial, Sigonella tower asked Bjork if he could see a fishing village off to the left side of the airport with a long jetty and boats anchored on both sides.

Bjork: Roger, I see the fishing village.

Sigonella: 389, you are at the wrong airfield!

Bjork: Expletives deleted, but generally along the line of: "Carl, you Dumb Doofus Dunderhead, why did you let me make an absolute fool of myself - why didn't you tell me I didn't have the field in sight"?

We landed red-faced at Sigonella where the U.S. Navy and Italian Air Force let us cool our heels sitting on the bare floor of Base Operations for about 4 hours before refueling our aircraft. Paul Bjork spent the 4 hours muttering something that sort of went as follows: "The 3 most worthless things in the Air Force are the Runway Behind You, the Altitude Above You - and a Navigator With You"

Apparently Carl Covey was guilty of not being hot-wired into Bjork's mind and eyeballs, as just one of many deficiencies commonly found in navigators.

We took off from Sigonella and landed at Incirlik AB, Turkey about midnight. As we pulled off the runway onto the taxiway to jettison our drag chute, Bjork pulled the throttles back to Idle - with the #1 throttle slipping past the detent into the Off Position.

Realizing what happened, Paul Bjork threw the #1 throttle forward - with the pooled fuel igniting in the engine and torching fore and aft, creating a fireworks display against the dark Turkish sky similar to the launch of a Mini-Space Shot at Cape Canaveral.

The Gunner got out of the airplane, opened the fuel drains and we shut down on the taxiway. After an engine change, we got to fly our first ELINT mission over the Black Sea.

On 21 September 1961, we left Turkey on our scheduled redeployment back to Shaw via Wheelus AB [Tripoli, Libya], Moron AB, Spain and Air-to-Air Refuelings over the Azore Islands and Bermuda.

To expedite matters of utmost importance and get to Spain ASAP [if not sooner], Paul Bjork announced that he had flown fighters out of Wheelus and knew the base like the palm of his hand. He went on to say that Wheelus had a long runway, and instructed Alvin Bobbitt and Jim Byram not to deploy their drag chutes in order to have a quick turn-around and get airborne for Moron AB, Spain.

Bjork called Wheelus Tower for a straight-in VFR approach, and as we came in over the water he had to add power 3 times to rescue the aircraft from mushing into the sea. Ed Breck was in EWO Position #2 and became more than a little bit nervous as he saw the ocean waves licking the belly of the aircraft - with flashback to having just recently survived the crash of RB-66C 471 at Donaldson AFB, South Carolina.

Bjork make a good landing on the runway numbers, and during roll-out forgot that the runway at Wheelus has a hump half way down the airfield. In seeing the runway disappear at its high point, he mistakenly thought he was nearing the end of the runway, stood on the binders and 389 ended-up with hot brakes - while the other 2 aircraft used the entire runway and stopped with minimum brakes.

We pulled off on the taxiway where we shut-down with hot brakes and evacuated the aircraft.

After the mandatory brake cooling-off period, the aircraft was towed to the ramp for refueling - and instead of a minimum time quick-turn around and not having to replace the Drag Chute, we spent nearly 4 hours on the ground before heading to Moron AB, Spain.

At Moron, 389 lost AC Elevator Trim and instead of the scheduled non-stop flight back to Shaw with 2 airborne refuelings, we nation-hopped; landing at Lajes Field [Azore Islands] and Harmon AFB, Newfoundland before arriving back at Shaw on 23 September 1961.

A KC-97 pilot friend of mine at Harmon AFB watched us take-off and said all 3 RB-66s used up every inch of the runway plus the 1000 foot PSP Overrun, and when the dust settled, we were observed in a slow climb.

Sort of reminiscent of the missions we flew from RAF Luqa, Malta where the RB-66C would use up the entire runway, all of the overrun - and then drop out of sight over a cliff at the end of the runway, while the RAF types placed bets on whether we would get climb speed before we hit the water. Even without the wax on his 2 inch blonde crew-cut, Helmsman Flight Safety Officer Bill Brown's hair stood straight up in his helmet as he wondered if we were going to survive the takeoffs at RAF Luqa.

Back to Carl Covey. One evening in the Officer's Club at Incirlik AB, Turkey Carl was in a heated, passionate exchange with someone across the table as the Turkish waiter took our orders. As the patient waiter waited patiently for Carl to finish his tirade, I tapped Carl and pointed to the waiter waiting to take Carl's order. Carl looked at the waiter and said "Bravo Sierra" [Bull Merde], which was directed at the guy across the table but mistakenly acknowledged by the waiter as, "Shish Kabob - thanks for your order" -- and the waiter departed for the kitchen.

After Carl had ended his debate and realized he was hungry, he asked why the waiter had disappeared. I asked him why he needed a waiter when he had already placed his order for Shish Kabob.

Other Little Know Factoids [LKF] in the realm of culinary delights and good deals in the early 1960s were the 57 cent All You Can Eat Steak Night every Wednesday at the Officer's Club at Lajes, Azore Islands - where the 5 cent shoe shines, 15 cent haircuts and 25 cent sauna baths were well worth stocking up on and taking back to Shaw for a ready supply. Anyway, this was the logic among the Navigators and EWOs.

Despite severe stupidity and naivety, Navigators and EWOs were nevertheless smart enough to keep their mouths shut and not tell stories like this while on active duty! I'm positive my good friend Paul Bjork would forgive me if he were still alive.

Don't Ask - and I may not tell!

Fortunately, I was always on my Best Behavior - and can only hope that other people's memories have failed them when it comes to blackmail material.

One of my better Officer Efficiency Reports reads: "Nobody is totally worthless, as evidenced by Ned Colburn, who is the Best Bad Example I know of for others not to emulate".

There was also something about, "Has a tendency to push on doors marked Pull."