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Autobiographical Sketch
of Arthur "Kibby" Taylor
Emphasis Is on His
Arthur
K. Taylor, known worldwide as Kibby, was born in 1930 and grew up in rural
community. Graduated
I
graduated multi-engine pilot training class 53G (T-6, T-28 & B-25) in
December 1953. After a short TDY flying
B-25s at
After
T-33 Jet Qualification, I reported to 11th TRS,
In
August 1961, I was assigned to the 20th Air Transport Squadron, Dover AFB,
I
reported to Maxwell AFB,
From
Maxwell AFB my first assignment was to
Two
Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons, 41TEWS and 6460TEWS, were stationed
at
Many
of the EB-66Cs assigned to the 41TEWS were the same RB-66Cs we had flown in
I
soon discovered that two pilots from Japan, were already there, one who had
been WB-66D Standardization Pilot and 11TRS Operations Officer, was Commander
of the 6460TEWS, the other, a pilot in the 41TEWS, whom I had replaced as
Standardization pilot for RB-66C in Japan.
They were short of EB-66 aircrews at Takhli and waiting for us. The
day we arrived, Lt. Col. Dick Keller, who had gone through Shaw and arrived
with us, told me he was the new 41TEWS Squadron Commander. The next day he informed me that I was his Squadron
Operations Officer. The old Commander
had just rotated and the old Operations Officer, due to rotate within days,
was acting Commander. So there went the continuity of command. Getting settled
in, acquainted with the Ops. Officer job, and theater
checkout made for several short nights for a while. In fact there was not much let up for the next
nine months.
Fortunately
I had been qualified as Instructor Pilot and had operational experience with
the passive electronic surveillance mission and larger crew of the EB-66C.
I had a lot of confidence in the aircraft in spite of it being under powered
and the resulting long take-off rolls causing it to join a list of aircraft
dubbed the "Lead Sled". We
were operating at maximum gross weight of 83,000 pounds. Most new pilots had
no experience operating the B-66 at such heavy weights. The first week at
Takhli the Commander and I were in the Control Tower observing departures
of some of our aircraft. As a pilot
who trained with us at Shaw neared lift-off he retracted his gear on the first
skip and as the gear was coming up he was settling. He got airborne but only
after grinding two inches off of antenna on the belly of the aircraft. It took a while for the Commander and me to
recover from the shock. We both expected
the aircraft to slide off the end of the runway.
Take-off
roll was a very critical phase of our mission.
It may have been a "Lead Sled" and could not maneuver with
a fighter but was stable and could respond well if you asked with authority. Pilot visibility was limited making it difficult
to see threats from below and within a 90 degree cone of attack from the rear.
Our rear surveillance had been removed with the tail gun radar.
We
were essentially defenseless against fighters and very limited in ability
to see and evade strikes from surface to air missiles (SAM). If attacked by either, our best defense were
high G turns, which could only be sustained by full power in a rapid descent.
Adding to our dilemma we could not tell when and in which direction to turn.
Sooner or later such maneuver brought you to low altitude, below 15,000
feet, where you were exposed to anti-aircraft attack (AAA) weapons that were
not dependent on radar control. (We believed our jammers were very effective
against AAA guns capable of attack at higher altitudes.)
If we got that far and they did not break off the attack, or we found
a place to hide, we needed help from somewhere before we run out of airspeed,
altitude and ideas. Such vulnerability was one of the factors considered in
out tactics. We were not scheduled to fly in areas of high
threat from MIG fighters without friendly fighter cover, or fly within range
of known SAM sites.
Our
job was to protect our forces by degrading the capability of enemy radar to
control weapons fired at strike aircraft.
Our tactics depended on the intensity of enemy defenses in the target
area. The North Vietnam Theater of
Operations was divided into seven Route Packages, RP-1, through RP-6 and RP-6a,
with RP-1 being just north of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South
Vietnam and RP-6 and RP-6a, dividing the heavily defended area around Hanoi.
A fifty mile wide no-fly zone was established just below the Chine
border to minimize possibility of incursion into China and the resulting political
uproar. Our tactics were to orbit at
about 30,000 feet 20 to 40 miles from the target area, preferably over the
inbound route of the strike force. We degraded enemy radar control by dropping
chaff which introduced false signals on their radar and mass jamming to saturate
their scope with electronic noise, thereby denying them ability to control
their guns and rockets. The EB-66C had nine jammers and provided some warning
to other aircraft by their ability to detect a variety of radar threats, determine
direction and type of threat, and gather intelligence about types of radar
and their locations. The EB-66E had
more jamming power with twenty-one jammers but limited capability for signal
analysis.
Strikes
in the RP-1 through RP-5 were covered by orbit of a single EB-66, spreading
the EB-66 support to cover more target areas.
Missions covering strikes in these areas on the western side of North
Vietnam were normally shorter and did not require in-flight refueling. Missions covering strikes on the eastern side
were longer and normally involved in-flight refueling from a KC-135 over the
Tonkin Gulf. Strikes in RP-6 and RP-6a
included larger forces in the heart of the heaviest defended area. These missions
were longer, therefore, requiring in-flight refueling. For this area our support include both an EB-66C
and an EB-66E in the same orbit covered by a flight of 4 F-4C fighters to
defend our flight against MIG fighter attack. The EB-66s flew an in-trail
formation in the threat area to keep one aircraft in level flight at all times
since jamming effect was degraded when banking the aircraft. Two F-4Cs were assigned to cover each EB-66.
To
do the job we had about twenty crews assigned at any one time, with one Pilot,
one Navigator and four Electronic Warfare Officers (EWO) per crew, our unit
had 120 aircrew members trying to keep the bad guys off of the strike force.
Pilots had prior experience in a variety of aircraft; several came from non-flying
duty. As I remember only two of us
had prior B-66 experience. Some Navigators
came direct from Navigators School to B-66 training; others were being withdrawn
from non-flying positions and a few with recent operational experience. Three
quarters of the EWOs were direct out of EWO School.
Everyone
was, naturally, anxious to complete their tour and rotate back to the States
as soon as possible so scheduling equity was closely monitored. When I arrived a tour was one year or 100 missions
over North Vietnam, or a tour reduction of one month for each 10 missions
flown over North Vietnam (the month tour reduction option was eliminated after
1966). Most of the missions were counters,
penetrated North Vietnam, but a few held orbits over Laos or South Vietnam
and were not coveted by those trying to shorten their tour.
In-Theater
check-out for pilots was five flights with an Instructor Pilot (IP) in the
Gunner's seat, starting with lower threat areas supporting strikes in the
lower Route Packs, including day and night air-refueling, and ending with
a mission supporting strikes near Hanoi. These sorties exposed new pilots
to the various combat environments.
The
first three flights must have been routine because I can recall nothing spectacular
about them except the intensity of activity on the airfield at Takhli during
mission launch. My fourth was a night mission scheduled to cover two strikes
in the lower Route Packs from orbits on the east side over the Tonkin Gulf
with air-refueling between strike aircraft Times Over Target (TOT).
I was a little apprehensive, having spent a few tense hours over the
Tonkin Gulf before and this was my first night in-flight refueling. Although
I was proficient at day in-flight refueling from a KB-50 in 1960 I had not
recent refueled experience. I especially wanted to set a good example as
the new Operations Officer. This flight
did not start well from the ramp; someone set off a survival beacon and we
had to listen to that eerie signal through takeoff.
The beacon did not go away with distance from the base so it was one
of our survival radios that we had to listen to for the next six hours. They
do not put those where you can easily get to them in flight. We proceeded to the first orbit, covered the
first strike, rendezvoused with the KC-135 tanker and by the time we had to
depart to cover the second strike, after repeated attempts I had receive little
fuel. We went to the second orbit,
covered the strike and returned to the tanker for another last attempt to
get enough fuel to return to Takhli. Otherwise we would have to land at Da
Nang AB, South Vietnam for fuel. They
shoot mortars and rockets at people down there so there was strong motivation
to get a successful in flight refueling this time.
After much more sweat we got enough fuel to get back to Takhli. The mission was completed successfully and we
got rid of the beeper noise, which turned out to be the survival radio packed
in my parachute. I did not write home
nor boast in the bar about that mission.
------------------------------- F-4C / MIG Dogfight Saves EB-66C (Newark 01) ------------------------------
My
final flight, with an instructor in the Gunner's seat, was on November 5,
1966. I was to be lead for a mission
north of Hanoi with both EB-66C (Newark 01) and an EB-66E (Newark 02) on orbit
covering a large strike near Hanoi. After difficulty with the night in-flight
refueling, my concern about that phase of the mission took the edge off of
my worries about the higher threat area. The
EB-66E aborted in the climb, too late to launch a spare. The entire strike force was airborne and on
the way to their targets. So we continued as a single ship and were going
to have to do the best we could with our remaining nine electronic jammers
instead of thirty with two aircraft. In-flight
refueling and rendezvous with Opal Flight (4 F-4Cs from of DA Nang AB) went
well. When I told Opal 1 (Lead) that
Newark 02 (EB-66E) had aborted, he advised that his 3 & 4 F-4Cs did not
get topped off with fuel from the tanker and would orbit high above us to
conserve fuel.
We
started jamming low frequency, long range radar, to degrade enemy tracking
of the in-bound strike force. Entering North Vietnam airspace we changed radio
frequency to monitor strike forces, Opal Lead and 2 took defensive positions
behind us on each side, Opal 3 and 4 held high but maintained visual contact
with our flight. As we proceeded to our orbit we could tell by radio calls
that strike aircraft should be close to planned TOT. The orbit area was called
"The Pocket" because it was an area about fifty miles long west
to east and twenty miles south to north, on the north was a buffer zone at
the Chinese border, the rest was circled by active SAM sites except for a
narrow five mile wide entry corridor. On
entering "The Pocket" at the Red River I revised orbit tactics to
adjust for the aborted EB-66E. Airspeed was increased to .78 MAC (300 knots
indicated) to permit a faster rate of turn and therefore allow more wing-level
jamming time and give the F-4Cs a speed more suited to their performance envelope.
We also began jamming to cover the strike force while they were approaching
the target area. The situation was
tense in orbit at 30,000 feet in "The Pocket" but with clear skies
and the normal thick haze below restricting our visibility of the target areas.
About
five minutes before TOT, Red Crown, a friendly radar warning station, issued
a MIG warning to the force indicating that hostile fighters were within fifty
miles west of us on our outbound route. We were west bound at the eastern
end of the orbit when my EWOs advised that they were receiving enemy fighter
radar at 12 O'Clock and I advised Opal Flight.
After overcoming poor radio reception we determined that the last strike
aircraft was off target about two minutes after TOT. Just after I told the
F-4Cs that we were cleared to egress Red Crown called Newark, our call sign,
with a MIG warning. Within less than
a minute my EWOs advised me that the enemy fighter radar signal was a 6 O'clock
and I passed this news to the F-4Cs. Then things happened fast.
From
a position to my right rear Opal Lead's GIB (Guy in the Back) called "MIG"
and Opal 2 also saw the MIG coming between the two F-4Cs headed for the B-66
at a high rate of overtake. From our
EWO tape it sounds like his radar was locked-on to us and ready to fire.
The MIG fired a missile at the B-66 as it passed between Opal Lead
and Opal 2. Opal Lead called
"Break Right 66"; a call that I did not hear but is on the
tape. When I did not respond to the break call he
repeated it twice with a shout. As
they jettisoned their external fuel tanks to cleanup their aircraft for a
fight the second MIG came in between them. I heard the second "Break
Right" and in one motion, I went full power, hard right-bank, lots of
right rudder to start the nose down followed by a hard pull into the turn. About that time my Navigator repeated "Break
right and all the way down". I could not see the threat and for the next
60 seconds I was totally dependent on Opal Lead for guidance about evasive
actions. Fortunately the missile missed to my left. I was descending rapidly
in a tight right spiral at above .92 MAC, redline speed, on the edge of a
buffet pulling all the Gs I could get. The
first MIG followed me into the spiral and Opal Lead was in afterburner going
after him. I heard Opal 2 say "Lead
you've got a MIG on your tail" and Lead respond simply "How are
you doing on him?" This confirmed
that we had five aircraft following in trail down a steep spiral.
We were in front with the EB-66C, the first MIG-21 on our tail, Opal
Lead (an F-4C) on him, a second MIG-21 on his tail and Opal 2 (an F-4C) on
the second MIG. Opal Lead told me later that and he flew his
aircraft very close to the MIG to try to drive the MIG off of the B-66 and
that we were pulling too many Gs for he or the MIG to get off a missile (which
was my intention). The MIG did pull off and swing out to the left for a position
to come in at a better angle and get off another missile. Opal Lead called
for me to reverse my turn to the left. When
I reversed the spiral to the left, we cut back under the MIG and deny him
a shot at us. By this time we were
below 15,000 feet. I saw a small cloud,
in an otherwise clear sky, to our right. I
turned back hard right and headed for the cloud. As we entered the cloud I pulled back hard to
level flight at 10,000 feet and continued the turn. I could not sustain the high turn rate and rapidly
lost airspeed at full power so I had to ease off the turn and look for a new
solution.
At
the time I was not aware of details of an intense dog-fight that was taking
place around me. From "Joe"
Latham's article in the October 1967 issue of Esquire Magazine, we learn that
as Opal Lead reversed his turn to the left after the first MIG, the second
MIG behind him went to the right in a nose high yo-yo maneuver for a shot
at Opal Lead. As the second MIG moved high to the right the GIB in Opal 2
advised his pilot that he had a lock-on (set up to fire). Latham reports,
"as the MIG rolled back for his attack, I put the pipper on him and squeezed
the trigger. The sidewinder (a heat-seeking missile) left the F-4C headed
for the second MIG-21 about 1,500 feet away. As I began to break away, we
saw the missile explode in a red fireball in the MIG's tail."
I
heard Opal 2's call about the MIG splash with the ground. In the meantime Opal Lead had maneuvered into
firing position on the first MIG-21. His
missile exploded near the MIG and he watched the MIG pilot eject from his
aircraft.
With
the score F-4Cs 2, MIG-21s 0, a big part of our problem was solved. We were still down in a AAA danger zone with
all jammers off line from overheating due to high G loads. I had two priorities, safer altitude and distance
away from the threat area but I had to compromise with a little of both and
sweat out threats from the ground. Our
EWOs were warnings of active AAA and SAM radar in our area and an ominous
SAM guidance radar signal indicating a possible missile launch. I advised my extra eyes (the F-4Cs) but no SAMs
were seen. We exited "The Pocket"
and were relieved to exit North Vietnam with safer altitude and airspeed.
Opal Flight was safe from one threat but had to face the problem of fuel shortage.
They elected not to try to find a Tanker and landed at Udorn
RTAB for fuel before returning to DA Nang AB. The big Celebration of their MIG kills had to
be delayed until they could get back to home base.
We
returned to Takhli and were thankful to be on the ground. I wrote in the maintenance records that we had
exceeded operating limits of airspeed over .92 MAC, over 4 Gs, and exceeding
rolling G limits. No evidence of aircraft damage was found on post flight
inspection but they did find a cracked aileron bracket after a few more flights.
From
my previous experience with the B-66 and other aircraft built by Douglas Aircraft,
I had confidence that the B-66 structure could take the punishment and I could
maintain positive control of the aircraft even outside of maneuvering limits.
I
passed my final theater orientation flight check and was cleared for unsupervised
flights. If my IP said anything during
the MIG engagement I cannot remember it. Perhaps he realized the risk of interfering
with a critical radio call if he used the inter-phone. Later in the evening I talked to Opal Lead and
others by phone to thank them for saving us from the MIGs and congratulate
them on their MIG kills. Later I had
a friend stationed at Danang act as my proxy to buy Opal Flight crews dinner
and drinks. This flight was certainly
one worth talking about at the bar but I had 95 more missions on this tour
and elected not to tell my wife and three children who were living near Shaw
AFB, South Carolina. About ten days
later I received a letter from my wife including a newspaper article with
photos, about F-4C crews shooting two MIGs off a B-66.
She had no idea that I was involved but suggested that I might know
someone who would want the article.
I
am thankful that I never had another flight like that one. A few missions later we were on a single EB-66C
orbit southwest of Hanoi without fighter protection. As we were leaving the
orbit our EWOs started receiving enemy fighter radar signals. We did not know how close the fighters were
or if we were their target but the situation gave us great concern. We entered
a series of tight turns in both directions and ducked in and out of clouds.
I could not see another aircraft and the signals seemed to fade so we were
able to get out of North Vietnam without further incident.
In
late November 1966, 7th Air Force scheduled a Tactics Symposium to discuss
overall operational tactics for Air Force units involved with strike missions
over North Vietnam. Representatives of all units involved attended and it
was hosted by Colonels Robin Olds and "Chappy" James, Commander
and Vice Commander of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon RTAFB. I attended
the meting along with two of our EWOs and an ECM Technical Representative. The importance of electronic support for air
strikes was given emphasis when Colonel Robin Olds chose to chair the ECM
discussion panel and he displayed good knowledge of the technical aspects
of electronic warfare. A later tactics
conference at Korat RTAFB is reported to have been the genesis of the Red
River Valley Fighter Pilots Association (River Rats).
My
memory presents no outstanding events until Christmas is upon us but Bob Hope
must have arrive on his tour of South East Asia Bases about that time. During
his stop at Takhli RTAB to entertain the troops, I caught the first half of
the show but my crew had to leave the performance for briefing and a mission. The war goes on..
On
Christmas Day I flew a single EB-66C sortie supporting strikes in the lower
Rout Packs. Inbound to the orbit I recognized a voice from the past on the
radio, a friend from EB-66s in Japan trying to get a flight of F-100s assembled
to proceed on a strike. As we proceeded
on our way, we passed our greetings in code, such as "Are you walking
around in the rain like an owl carrying an umbrella and a cathode-ray tube
under your wing?" describing the 11TRS unit patch we wore in Japan. Occasionally,
during orbit, I could see the ground near Mugia Pass. I was amazed at prior
strike damage. The area was covered
with bomb craters and looked like a different planet. As we (Nelson 01) departed
the orbit I contacted a radar sit for RTB (return to base) clearance. The
operator's normal responded was "Roger Nelson" followed by clearance
to Channel 49 (Takhli's TACAN station). This routine response seemed like
a personal Christmas greeting for our Navigator whose name was Roger Nelson.
Small things lightened the spirit as we returned from a mission on
that Christmas Day..
We
all rejoiced over the MIG sweep Robin Olds lead the first of January, although,
I envied the men who flew EB-66C support for it.
As
1967 began we had a change of Commanders of 13th Air Force in the Philippines.
The old commander had grounded a 41TEWS pilot who ran off the runway
while landing in a rainstorm in the fall of 1966. Requests to return him to
flying duties had been denied and he was occupied as Officer in Charge of
Personal Equipment since the incident. With a new 13AF Commander our proposal
to get him requalified in the EB-66 was finally approved.
We had two EB-66Cs that had sever leaks from wing fuel tanks and were
limited to flight with fuel in only fuselage tanks making them incapable of
flying operational missions. Using
them as training aircraft, we retrained him for combat operations. Our efforts to return him to flying resulted
in his misfortune. On February 4, 1967, he was scheduled for a sortie supporting
strikes in the lower Rout Packs. During
briefing 7th Air Force directed a change in their mission to support a strike
near Hanoi. Without hesitation, the
crew launched on that mission. They were hit by a SAM and went down north
of Hanoi in "The Pocket", too deep into enemy territory for a search
and rescue attempt.
That
crew and their status are:
Capt. John Fer, Pilot; POW, returned Apr. 3, 1973
Maj.
Jack Bomar, Navigator; POW, returned Mar. 4, 1973
Maj.
Woodrow Hoover Wilburn, EWO; KIA, remains returned Dec. 20, 1969
Capt. Herb Doby, EWO; KIA, remains returned Sep. 3,
1977
Capt.
Russell Arden Poor, EWO; MIA, presumed dead
Lt.
John Owen Davies, EWO, POW, returned Feb. 18, 1973
During
a scheduled runway close for repair we were to deploy to Udorn RTAB on February
5th and continue operations from there for about a week. The 41TEWS Commander had to remain at Takhli
to handle casualty affairs of the downed crew so he gave me command of the
deploying force until he could get up to Udorn a few days alter. Our operations out of Udorn were in lower threat
areas and nothing unusual occurred. Except,
one of our most experienced pilots was scheduled for a night orbit over the
Tonkin Gulf with in-flight refueling. He just happened to have the aircraft that I
had trouble refueling on my night refueling check and he had similar trouble.
We decided to use other aircraft for in-flight refueling missions.
That seemed to solve the problem.
We
were beginning to realize shortage of operational aircraft and put more pressure
on getting the two with fuel leaks repaired. We did not have local facilities to hanger them
for repair but space was located at Misawa AB, Japan and a repair team was
scheduled. All we had to do was get
them there. Since they were limited
to about 11,000 pounds, (less than a two-hour flight) usable fuel in fuselage
tanks they could not island hop to get there. I flew lead for the two EB-66Cs
as we went in a buddy flight with a KC-135 and used five in-flight refuelings
to get to Yokota AB, Japan. It was
then only a short flight on to Misawa. On
return to Takhli, we caught a KC-135 rotating from Japan to Takhli. In-route
they had a refueling mission over the Tonkin Gulf refueling a flight of F-104s
on fighter cover for strikes along the east side of North Vietnam. Overlooking the Tanker Boom Operator, I was
able to observe the other end of in-flight refueling.
About
March, a gear-up landing gave more emphasis to getting those two C-models
back into operations. The left main gear would not come down after recycling
many times. When they burned off extra
fuel and we ran out of ideas the pilot set up for a gear-up landing. There were several critical factors. High on the list was crew safety. The crew needed to get out fast after the aircraft
stopped on the runway. The Pilot and
Navigator could exit through their individual overhead hatches. All four EWOs had to exit through a small hatch
in the top of their crew compartment. The
crew reviewed emergency procedures for the situation. Actions emphasized were
jettisoning the EWO compartment hatch and replacing safety pins in ejection
systems on short final approach to prevent accidental actuation of a seat
ejection during their exit movements. It
was essential to suppress fire if it occurred and important to get the runway
back open for operations as soon as possible. Crash crews were stationed at the approach end
of the runway, including fire tucks, an HH-43 fire suppression helicopter,
cranes and equipment to lift the aircraft, and vehicles with a slew of people
(most were essential, some thought they were).
The aircraft landed, sparks flew, crash equipment followed in formation,
and the crew exited successfully. Damage included the underside of the fuselage
ground off through the skin and, to our horror, within an inch of a fuel drain.
The jettisoned EWO hatch struck the vertical stabilizer causing minor
damage. The gear problem was a broken
linkage that prevented correct sequencing of gear lowering mechanisms.
A repair team was imported and the aircraft returned to service.
I
made one trip to 7th Air Force Headquarters for coordination with their operations
staff and while there had dinner at the floating restaurant with an old friend
from Dover AFB. Bad guys bombed the floating restaurant a few weeks later.
One visit down there made me appreciate Takhli and the war.
April
30, 1967, was another sad day when the 355TFW at Takhli lost so many brave
men. I wore Leo Thorsness' POW/MIA
bracelet until his return. Another
day that I did not fly but wished I had. War
showed a special kind of hell that
day.
Once
we briefed and launched for a routine mission in a southwest orbit but about
thirty minutes after takeoff we received a call diverting us to an east orbit.
Details were provided including a tanker call sign that did not match
with the ones our KC-135s used. We concluded that the tanker must be a Navy
A3D. I was excited about the opportunity
to refuel from the Navy version of the B-66.
Unfortunately they directed us back to our original mission about fifteen
minutes later. I guess the boss walked
into their shop and changed their minds because it was a little unusual. Too
bad, he didn't know I was flying.
I
only had one aborted flight during my tour.
On a night mission during climb one engine exceeded maximum RPM and
lost nearly all thrust. My diagnosis
was failure of the exhaust nozzle thrust augmentation. Since it was not correctable and we could not
compensate for it we aborted, burned off fuel for an hour and landed. The J-71 engine on our B-66s had a lot of gimmicks
to get thrust up to a marginal capability for the aircraft. The exhaust nozzle thrust augmentation system
was one of them. When the nozzle goes
open the engine loses thrust..
I
did get a three day R&R to Bangkok. That
was needed and appreciated because it gave me a chance to shop for the family.
Near
the end of my tour I was schedule as instructor to supervise a new pilot on
an in-flight refueling mission over the Tonkin Gulf during daylight. Things went well until he had trouble refueling
on the way to orbit. Another attempt
on the way off orbit was still unsuccessful. To get enough fuel for RTB at Takhli, we changed
seats and I was able to hold refueling position long enough to get the required
fuel by cross-control of the aircraft to dampen oscillations. I was drenched with sweat as we returned to
Takhli in the aircraft that was not supposed to be scheduled on in-flight
refueling missions.
Since
I had flown over thirty counters before the policy changed, my DEROS (date
of estimated return from overseas) was rolled back to July 1967. By the first
of June other pilots with like return dates had stateside assignments. I had no assignment and went to check with Personnel.
As we looked through my file I noticed some strange codes for my education
and asked what they were. The Sergeant looked it up and said "you
have a Masters Degree in Personnel Administration". I told him to correct that immediately. My degree was in Public Administration and if
you don't change my record I will get assigned in Personnel. Three days later
I received my assignment to Headquarters US Air Force Military Personnel Center,
Randolph AFB, Texas.
In
June the new arrivals included some senior grade pilots who were destined
to replace the Commander and me so we started their transition into the positions
of Commander and Operations Officer. By
the last week of June the new commander and Operations Office had assumed
their positions and, to get out of the way, I took a trip over to Ubon RTAB. While there I rode the back seat on an F-4C
test flight over Laos. They did not object to supersonic booms over that territory.
We advanced power and accelerated through 1,000 knots true airspeed. It did not seem that fast at 40,000 feet.
A
great advantage to being a single pilot with five other crewmembers is getting
to perform an "end of tour fly-by" for all of them. The one I remember was started with a high-speed
pass down the runway and, at short final, the tower advised me that two F-86s
were on takeoff roll. I was over the
ramp when I saw an F-86 lift off under my left wing. I immediately executed a right climbing turn
that put me momentarily eyeball to eyeball with the Control Tower operators.
I did not do any damage, unlike the flight of two F-105s that blasted me out
of bed one morning as they broke the sound barrier on their pass. That is their story and I will let them tell
it; great guys, both of them.
I
had my last combat flight the first of July and ended with 100 missions, 92
were counters. As I walked into the officers' Club after the mission for refreshments
and dinner a large group greeted me for my surprise End of Tour Party. As
a reminder of my tour at Takhli, they presented me with a picture of EB-66C,
just after take-off with the gear still coming up and the nose door open to
show 459, the aircraft tail number. Hanging
on my "I Love Me Wall" is that picture with signatures on the back
of those present as follows: (I had
to guess at some of the signatures)
To Kibby Taylor
Col.
Bob Scott
H. Lobdell
"I
was there too" (unreadable) Jones
Bill Holland
Pete
Summer
Harley Black
Burt
Fontener
L. F. Dean
Raymond
L. Arnold
Jim Sheerow
John
A. Donelson
Jery Kott
(unreadable)
Mitchell (EWO type) Donald
L. Mitchell
Ralph
E. Dagbusher (sic)
Joe N. Briggs
Willie
Williams (Big # Sqdn)
Hodge A. Willis (sic)
Best
of Luck Eddy M. Clark
Bob Summers
R.
S. Sheero
Bill Puckett
Norm
Bessette
Bud Scherer
J.
W. Johnson
Leslie Meyer
John
C. Putman
Jack Roddy
Harry
G. Fagler, Jr.
Dick Lukstat
Alfred
A. FitzSimmons
Rolsan L. Jackson
Bill
Nowacki
Ewal R. Brown
Tom
O'Hare
Robert Best
"To
the best d---- Ops Officer a Commander could have. S---- Hot you are.
Richard
M. Keller, Lt. Col."
(I
had a great respect for my Commander, Lt. Col. Keller. After that comment I was proud to get on an
aircraft bound for the "States" and fade away.)
Two
days later Col. Keller and I departed for Bangkok to catch a United Airways
flight to the Continental United States. On
landing at Travis AFB, California, the United Captain said, "Welcome
home and Thanks from all of us." Right then we all felt very proud. I arrived back with my family in Sumter, South
Carolina, July 4, 1967.
After
30 days leave I reported for duty at USAF/MPC/DPMR2 (Military Personnel Center,
Multi-engine Pilot Assignments) dedicated to keeping Southeast Asia Forces
manned with qualified pilots which was another kind of war with twelve hour
days for four years. That kind of duty
makes you understand why some people volunteer for a second combat tour.
The
error in my education codes continued to haunt me. (Actually it never affected any of my assignments
before or after but it makes a good story.) After USAF/MPC I served three
years in personnel related fields.
First was at the Air Force Academy as Deputy Commandant for Military
Instructions. Following that was five years as Director of
Base Personnel at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio and Clark AB, Philippines.
I
retire at MacDill AFB, Florida, November 1, 1979 and resided in the Tampa
area for 15 years before returning to my native Butler County, Kentucky.
This
story falls very short of describing the sacrifice others made.
For a list of those to whom this meager effort is dedicated check the following
sites:
http://userdb.rootsweb.com/pow_mia/
http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmsea/pmsea_all_p_usaf.pdf
Check
6!
Any
errors, omissions or typos may be blamed on,
Arthur Kibby Taylor, Colonel, United States Air Force, Retired
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